From the Swiss Eidgenossenschaft to the EUgenossenschaft: this transformation represents the democratic and social erosion of Europe’s oldest democracy. (Too many) Swiss academics, journalists and others, self-proclaimed ‘highly educated’ professionals, regard this centuries-old confederation as a medieval relic, disconnected from the European Union’s modern era.
The systematic belittling of the Confederation
In numerous publications, they never miss a chance to disparage the confederation. Their ideology has little to do with history, however. According to them, Switzerland owes its existence only to France after 1515 (Marignano and the subsequent Eternal Peace of 1516 and 1521) and to the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815).
Historically, however, this is incorrect. As early as 1648, the Swiss Confederation of 13 (sovereign) cantons was already recognised as an independent state, just like the Republic of the Seven United (sovereign) Provinces of the Netherlands.
Moreover, up to 1515, the Confederation was a major military power that had defeated not only the Habsburgs but also the Duchy of Burgundy. Without this Confederation, the faltering Kingdom of France might well have been wiped off the map by that duchy, becoming the Burgundian kingdom instead.
France has often benefited from its relationship with the Confederation (the Perpetual Peace of 1516/1521): it served as a buffer against the Habsburgs, provided mercenaries, and offered access to Alpine passes, transport routes, and trade.

Grandson 1476-2026
Politically motivated anachronism
A Swiss historian in Franco‑German service even trivialises the world‑unique system of direct democracy (“direct democracy is overrated”). One has to dare say that, especially from centralised, bureaucratic and volatile France and from a declining Germany.
In another publication, some compared the pillaging Swiss Confederates of the 15th and 16th centuries to today’s mafia clans. This comparison is not only anachronistic but also misleading. All military formations at the time engaged in plunder and the devastation of cities and regions.
Similarly, while one academic refers to the period’s “envious confederates” (“Neidgenossen”), rivalries between cities, provinces, and principalities were widespread across the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and throughout Europe. Such selective comparisons oversimplify a broader historical pattern.

Grandson Castle, Bern and Fribourg jointly administered Grandson until 1798
De compromissen en korte oorlogen tijdens de religieuze conflicten van de 16e en 17e eeuw, het Simultaneum, de korte Sonderbundsoorlog en het gezamenlijke bestuur van onderworpen gebieden, bijvoorbeeld in de kantons Vaud, Aargau en Thurgau, bieden een heel ander perspectief.
The absurd zeal to prove the non‑existence of William Tell (Wilhelm Tell) or of the first alliances between today’s cantons in the 13th and 14th centuries also fits into this pattern. Romulus and Remus, the goddess Athena, and Kenau Simonsdochter Hasselaer (or Marianne) are never questioned in Italy, Greece, France, or the Netherlands. It is about symbolism, and William Tell conveys it exceptionally effectively and well.

Romeyn de Hooghe (1645-1708), 1690, the Spanish siege of Haarlem in 1573. Kenau Simonsdochter Hasselaer on the left.
Democratic impoverishment in the Netherlands
It is said of fish that decay always starts at the head. This idea applies to countries, companies, and universities: their democratic, economic, and scientific functioning can be undermined from the top. This issue involves not only the politically coloured opinions of Swiss professionals mentioned above, but also democracy itself.
In the Netherlands, where democracy is compromised by institutionalised corruption (the corruption à la néerlandaise), citizens rarely have a say in the scope, pace, or themes of European integration. The sole exception was the 2005 referendum on the EU Constitution.
In elections to the European Parliament (with a turnout of 30%-40%) or to the national parliament, European issues play no role at all. In contrast, in the 2005 referendum, turnout was 63.3%, with 62% voting against further integration. The establishment’s response was to not only ignore the result, but also to abolish the referendum itself—the first in 200 years!
Planned referendums in 10 other countries were also cancelled. Since then, Dutch democracy has eroded as promises—on migration, the euro, bureaucracy, the EU—go unfulfilled, and elections become routine exercises in rhetoric.
Citizens have by now become numb to this institutionalised corruption à la néerlandaise. Only 4% of citizens, according to polls, still have confidence in this politics of broken promises and in politics as a business model for a few with lucrative (European and international) jobs for the few.

Charles Howard Hodges (1764-1837), 1809, Louis Bonaparte (1778-1846), King of the Netherlands, 1806-1810. Collection: Rijksmuseum Amsterdam
The Republic of the Seven United Provinces and the Confederation of Cantons
What does this have to do with Switzerland? A great deal. Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) dissolved the Republic of the Seven United Provinces, which first became the Batavian Republic, then the Kingdom of Holland under King Louis Bonaparte (1778-1846) from 1806 to 1810, and finally was annexed by the French Empire from 1810 to 1813. At the Congress of Vienna (1814/15), the monarchy (the House of Orange-Nassau) and a centralised unitary state were confirmed without resistance by the provinces.

Napoleon Bonaparte was forced to abandon his creation, the Helvetic Republic (1798–1803), due to strong resistance from the cantons. The sovereign cantons of the new Confederation (with 19 cantons) were restored as a continuation of the Confederation of 1648 (1803–1813). In 1815, the great powers (Prussia, France, England, Russia and Austria) recognised Switzerland as an economically significant and neutral Confederation at the heart of Europe.
This recognition had nothing to do with a favour, but with centuries of diplomatic, political, social, cultural, scientific, military and economic history dating back to the 13th century.
Uniquely in Europe, Central Switzerland’s villages were recognised in the 13th and 14th centuries as free entities (Reichsunmittelbarkeit) within the Holy Roman Empire, on an equal footing with major cities such as Basel, Strasbourg, Cologne, Bern, and the Hanseatic cities.

Trogen (canton of Appenzell Ausserrhoden)
This status fostered their urban character, shaped by trade, military success, European networks, diplomacy, and exchange. In light of this history, today’s Swiss urban elites could show more respect toward Central Switzerland and its ‘medieval’ cantons.

Stans (canton of Nidwalden)
Political impoverishment in Switzerland
What does this short historical overview have to do with the present? A great deal. The politics of Central Switzerland (The Innerschweiz) have, to this day, been characterised by direct democracy, pragmatism, realism, and restraint, and have renounced political adventures since 1515. In contrast, the centralised Netherlands presents a different model: citizens have—apart from voting in periodic elections—no direct influence over political appointments. The same pattern is evident in relations with the European Union, where, with a single exception, citizens have never had a say.
However, out of opportunism, the Swiss (political) establishment, including members of the federal government, ignores the Constitution, the majority of cantons (Ständemehr), and the sovereign cantons. Instead, it favours a political adventure with the European Union.
The failure to secure a majority of cantons in institutional amendments to the Constitution not only amounts to political Verelendung, but is also unconstitutional and spells the end of Switzerland’s unique system of direct democracy and the Confederation of Cantons and the People.
Perhaps the political establishment can abolish the medieval monstrosity of the Ständemehr, following the Dutch example of abolishing the referendum. Activism, declining quality and experience, and an erosion of Swissness (for various reasons) now also characterise Swiss politics. This is not a good omen for Swiss society and the country.
The politician and entrepreneur Alfred Escher (1819–1882) wrote in 1848 what is still the basis of Swiss democracy, federal system, decentralisation and subsidiarity:
„Der schöne Baum unseres neuen Bundes, der seine schützenden Zweige über das ganze Vaterland ausbreitet, hat zu seinen Wurzeln die Kantone. Würden wir diese Wurzeln verkümmern und absterben lassen, so wäre damit auch dem Baum der sichere Untergang bereitet. Die Kantone sind die Säulen, auf denen das ganze Bundesgebäude ruht“ (J. Jung, Alfred Eschers Thronreden, Zürich 2021).

Bern, Bundeshaus, the 26 cantons
Conclusion
After more than two hundred years, the former Republic of the Seven United Sovereign Provinces and the Confederation of sovereign cantons could find themselves integrated within a centralised European administrative apparatus. The centre of its administration is in Brussels and the judiciary in Luxembourg.
Switzerland, with its longstanding traditions and innovation in democracy, economy, education, and constitutional governance, now faces significant change. There are concerns that this could lead to a loss of unique Swiss features in favour of broader European interests, with new opportunities and challenges for those involved in European careers and prestige.
Scaremongering, fear of EU sanctions, lucrative European posts, supposed European prestige, business interests and a fictitious multicultural brotherhood are luring this society into an ever-deepening European quagmire of monetary, economic, democratic and social problems.
The era of the Federal Council’s ‘Sept sages’ is over. Activism, demagoguery, self-interest and opportunism have taken hold. Within ten years, ‘Dutch, German or Swedish social and political conditions and tensions’ will prevail in the Confederatio Helvetica too. The story of the rise and fall of a unique society in the heart of Europe.