Marignano, Credit Suisse, the F-35, customs negotiations and the EU

9 September 2026

The Battle of Marignano on 13 and 14 September 1515 brought an end to the Italian expansion of the cantons of the Swiss Confederation. The French kingdom under François I (1494–1547) emerged victorious. After a series of victories over the Habsburgs, culminating in the Peace of Basel (1499), and victories over the Duke of Burgundy (1474–1477), the Swiss Confederation became Europe’s military superpower.

From the beginning of the 15th century, the cantons conquered territories belonging to the Duke of Milan with varying degrees of success. After 1477, conquests in northern Italy followed (Ticino, Bormio, Valtellina, Chiavenna and, in 1512, even the Duchy of Milan). However, the defeat at Marignano also brought the Swiss Confederation back to reality.

Apart from Bern’s conquest of the Pays de Vaud from Savoy in 1536, there were no further foreign campaigns after 1515. The military lesson had been learnt. Modern warfare had appeared, and the Swiss Confederation lacked the political unity to cope with it.

The French king, however, respected the Swiss Confederation not only because of its role against the Habsburgs and Burgundians, but also because he needed this confederation of sovereign cantons as a buffer against the Habsburgs. The Perpetual Peace of 1516 and 1521 lasted until Napoleon’s invasion in 1798. The diplomats and representatives of the cantons were formidable and respected negotiators.

The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 subsequently confirmed the neutral status and political independence of the Swiss Confederation, comprising 13 sovereign cantons. This was by no means a foregone conclusion, but rather the result of lengthy negotiations, during which Swiss diplomats and representatives haggled over every comma and full stop. After all, the devil in international treaties is in the detail.

Credit Suisse

Credit Suisse’s international venture met with a less successful outcome. Various causes can be identified. The crux of the matter, however, is that this sound Swiss bank succumbed to a drive for expansion and overconfidence in a banking world governed by a different set of ethics. The bank’s governance structures and shareholders were still living in the world of the Swiss Confederation before Marignano.

In terms of experience, mindset and legal understanding, they were ill-prepared for the Anglo-Saxon style of banking that prevailed in the years following 1990. That is the main cause of this bank’s downfall, quite apart from the (criminal) liability of the board, governance bodies and the shareholders’ inability to say ‘no’ to absurd bonuses and megalomaniacal plans.

F-35

History is repeating itself with the necessary procurement of modern fighter aircraft, in this case the F-35. The Bundesrat (the federal government) appears not to be the right body to conduct contract negotiations with foreign countries in this competitive world, down to the last detail.

The situation is likely even more serious, and there has not even been a proper examination of the agreement at the highest level. There is no excuse for this, only the realisation that the Bundesrat, those in charge at the ministries and, above all, the members of parliament are not up to this task. Parliament, too, has failed.

Customs tariffs

This also applies to the negotiations with the Trump administration regarding customs tariffs. In spring 2025, an agreement was reached on a tariff of 10 per cent. All that remained was to await the Bundesrat’s approval. However, the Bundesrat took so long to respond that the unpredictable and impulsive president raised it to 39 per cent.

Here too, the Bundesrat has failed. Incidentally, what was the role of, for example, the Minister of Justice, who cannot have been pleased with this favourable outcome of the negotiations? After all, the EU had a much higher customs tariff, and that did not sit well with this advocate of EU membership.

Bilaterale III and the European Union

What does this say about the proposed treaty with the EU? Bilaterale III is, in fact and in legal terms, a euphemism for limited membership in an international organisation called the European Union. It involves a far-reaching transfer of sovereignty to the EU, and this is only the first step in the proposed accession process.

How many pages of the treaty will the Minister of Justice have read, and is he even competent or interested enough to scrutinise the content – down to every comma and full stop – and assess all its implications? After all, activism and a European political profile, rather than statesmanship in the service of the country, seem to be his guiding principle.

On previous occasions, at any rate, he has shown no sign of this; instead, activism has taken centre stage. This also applies to other members of the Bundesrat. One female member of the Bundesrat even responded to a question in an interview about the desirability of EU accession with the answer ‘Why not?’ And this member of the Bundesrat is expected to read and comprehend nearly 2,000 pages of constitutional and other legal implications?

The disregard for the mandatory Ständemehr (Federal Constitution, Art. 140b) by a majority of Bundesrat members also points in this direction. Wishful thinking, hope and expectations regarding relations with the EU prevail, rather than the letter and spirit of this treaty or the European practice of ‘pacta non sunt servanda’ and European judges who interpret the law very broadly. Here too, the devil is in the detail.

Conclusion

The above also applies to senior civil servants in ministries and to members of parliament. The lessons from Credit Suisse, the F-35 and recent customs negotiations with the US have not been learnt. On the one hand, there is activism; on the other, there is a lack of political, legal, and administrative insight, knowledge, and experience in complex international negotiations. In both cases, it appears that this key treaty with an international organisation has not been examined with the necessary thoroughness.

The centuries-old, successful Swiss model at the heart of Europe is at stake, not only to Switzerland’s detriment, but also to the EU’s, which will lose a beacon of certainty and stability. After all, Switzerland is not the political, educational, scientific, democratic, economic, monetary, and social problem; the EU is!