Whilst in the Netherlands, according to the most recent polls, as many as 76% of citizens want to see a limit on the number of migrant workers, asylum seekers and economic refugees, 55% of eligible voters in Switzerland rejected a 10 million-inhabitants cap on 14 June.

Small Switzerland, around 30 per cent of which is uninhabitable, is the fastest-growing country in Europe and is taking in large numbers of migrant workers and refugees, both in absolute and relative terms. Since the year 2000, the population has grown by more than 2 million, from 7.1 million to over 9.1 million in 2026. Net population growth exceeds 100,000 inhabitants annually.

Low unemployment, a traditionally innovative economy and high-quality industry, Europe’s best universities, excellent vocational training, quality of life, good infrastructure and the healthcare system act as a magnet.

Every day, more than 400,000 cross-border workers from France, Germany and Italy work in the country; 2 million foreign nationals live and work there permanently. In what sense is Switzerland a freeloader? The EU and many citizens beyond its borders have benefited from Switzerland for centuries; the country can look back on a successful economic, constitutional, scientific, cosmopolitan, and travel-loving history.

However, the pressure on infrastructure, the housing market, healthcare, education and integration has become too great. Unaffordable and scarce housing, overcrowded streets and public transport, an education system that is effectively no longer functioning due to a lack of integration, and a rise in serious crime. Parallel societies, a declining sense of security (once taken for granted), and a healthcare system reaching its limits are the reality.

These are facts that are also familiar in the Netherlands and other EU countries. A quantitative limit of 10 million may be neither appropriate nor practically feasible, but the message is clear. In the Swiss context, the fact that more than 55 per cent are against this proposal may seem convincing, but the result calls for a nuanced view.

Firstly, the initiative came from just a single political party (the SVP), which represents around 30 % of the population. The entire establishment (radio, television, (social) media, universities, the government, other political parties, trade unions, employers, numerous refugee organisations and other NGOs, etc.) was opposed to the initiative. The budget also speaks volumes: around 1.5 million compared with some 9 million for the opponents.

Feelings of shame (the ‘xenophobic’ and ‘isolated’ image of Switzerland, isolationism (Abschottung), the ‘far-right’ SVP), fear of the predicted ‘chaos’ and of EU sanctions were the main driving forces behind the opponents’ campaign. There was no analysis of population growth or of the (lack of) government policy. In effect, it was a campaign against the SVP. It was more a case of direct demagoguery than direct democracy – right up to the highest political level and in the media.

This comes as little surprise from parties such as the Socialist Party and the Greens. They have replaced the Socialist International with the European Federalist movement. They are what they are, and that is legitimate – seeking new voters (including 16-year-olds, the rapid naturalisation of migrants, and democratic quantity rather than quality, as in the good old days of international socialism) outside the bubble of urban ‘highly educated’ people and students.

It often results in populism and intolerance, which also exist on the left of the political spectrum and are perhaps even more dangerous than right-wing extremism, partly due to their growing links with Islamism.

However, the public statements made by the national Minister of Justice, Beat Jans (Socialist Party), contravene the law and the Constitution. This (former) activist has rebranded the officially (constitutionally) recognised name ‘Nachhaltigkeitsinitiative’ (sustainability initiative) as the ‘Chaosinitiative’. This has subsequently been adopted by other opponents of this citizens’ initiative.

But it did not stop there. He speculated and spread falsehoods about the consequences (including that hospitals would have to close immediately if the initiative were adopted, that it would amount to a ‘Brexit’, that the state pension age would have to rise, that the elderly would no longer receive care, and that the economy would collapse due to a labour shortage). Instead of leading the country as Minister of Justice, he waged a personal campaign by fearmongering in his capacity as a member of the national government.

The initiative aimed to introduce concrete measures once the population reached 9.5 million, develop a plan for labour migration, deport rejected and criminal asylum seekers, and restrict family reunification. Whether this would have worked is unknown, but it is at least a signal to a passive government and political establishment. In other countries, the mood is similar, but there is no direct democracy.

It is noteworthy that members of the SVP also had the courage to highlight, regardless of the vote’s outcome, the need to raise the AHV retirement age (currently 65). The other parties and the government, however, rejected it, whilst at the same time threatening those who voted ‘yes’ with an increase and suggesting that a ‘no’ vote would mean no increase. That is populism and demagoguery. The media reported it uncritically.

In no country – not even in the Netherlands, where the retirement age is 67 (and the trend is upwards) – is a link drawn with migration. After all, migrants are also living longer. This illustrates the manipulation of public opinion not by the right but by the left, including directionless centre-right-wing parties (a parallel in the Netherlands).

However, the initiative has another dimension: the ‘Bilateral III’ agreement with the EU submitted by the government. The agreement involves a far-reaching transfer of legislative, executive and judicial powers to the EU. Furthermore, this agreement will lead to significantly higher levels of immigration from (future) EU member states.

These migrants will automatically be granted a permanent residence permit after five years, including family reunification – which contravenes the Swiss Constitution (Art. 121) and current practice.

Although settlement in Switzerland is linked to an employment contract or self-employment status, the European Court of Justice already considers even a small number of working hours per week sufficient. And entitlement to social assistance after just a few months.

Given that millions of migrants in Spain (around 1 million with residence permits granted without adequate scrutiny) and neighbouring countries – particularly in Germany – have obtained an EU passport relatively easily, and that family and clan structures often prevail, it is easy in Switzerland to find an employment contract with a friendly (dubious) company.

Moreover, (direct) democracy is turning into a farce – as the Dutch example in the field of EU law demonstrates. The Dutch parliament is systematically not informed, informed too late or only partially informed about EU legislation; the EU sometimes fails to comply with legal requirements; or the country is regularly overruled by other countries (on the euro, climate, migration, construction policy, fisheries, the budget, reforms, etc.). Direct democracy does not exist; there are only elections every four years, and European issues never play a significant role, not even in the European elections. Citizens have only had a say on the EU once (in 2005, when 62 per cent voted against further integration).

Citizens in Switzerland can already barely cope with the large number of referendums at the municipal, cantonal and federal levels, let alone decide on hundreds of complicated EU laws or organise referendums on them. Moreover, the EU could even impose sanctions if EU legislation is rejected in a referendum. Furthermore, the Netherlands has only around 3% influence over decisions (and the government is often outvoted); Switzerland could have a say (around 2% influence), but there are already plenty of other avenues for this.

Furthermore, the agreement blatantly disregards Article 2 of the Constitution: Art. 2: Switzerland protects the rights of the people and guarantees the country’s independence. Direct democracy is perhaps the people’s most important right, but in practice it is being undermined, and independence is turning into dependence on Brussels.

The most problematic aspect, however, is the violation of the Swiss Constitution regarding the Ständemehr (the majority of the cantons, Art. 140 of the Constitution). The people and the cantons are the founders of Switzerland. As many representatives of the political parties are suspicious of the federal structure and the people, they disregard this constitutional principle in the case of a people’s vote on the Bilateral III agreement with the EU.

Art. 1: The Swiss people and the cantons form the Swiss Confederation.

Art. 3: The cantons are sovereign insofar as their sovereignty is not restricted by the Federal Constitution; they exercise all rights not transferred to the federal state.

Opponents of the ‘Standemehr’ argue that Switzerland is not joining the EU – although, through the transfer of institutional powers, it will be a part of the EU. Moreover, by transferring these powers to the EU, the EU is undermining the sovereignty of the cantons. This is also the beginning of a dynamic process, not the end.

This line of reasoning is reminiscent of dogmatic 19th-century jurists (‘the law is the law’), whereas for many generations now, the legislator’s purpose and intent have usually been the deciding factors. In other words, 19th-century dogmatism is being used to achieve a political goal in the 21st century.

A majority of the cantons is required for institutional transfers of power to international organisations, restrictions on cantonal sovereignty, and constitutional amendments. These conditions have been met. Other positions are of an opportunistic-political nature.

It is also reminiscent of the Netherlands: since 1815, no national referendum has taken place in this centrally governed country, not even on matters relating to the EU. In 2005, the time had come, and 62 per cent did not want further EU integration. The referendum was subsequently not only ignored but immediately abolished. After all, the people are too stupid. These days, only 4 per cent still have confidence in politics, and riots and unrest are the order of the day. Ignoring the majority of the cantons is similar.

This sustainability initiative – regardless of whether it is feasible – has turned into a crusade against the SVP and the voice of the people. In reality, far more people than the 45 % who voted ‘yes’ feel uneasy about population growth and the emergence of parallel societies. The message from this 45 % is unambiguous.

Apart from the Minister of Justice’s activist past and current behaviour, the forthcoming referendum on the Bilateral Agreement III (expected in 2028) also explains his tone  – an attitude unworthy of a member of the government and even contrary to the law and the Constitution. The EU and an international career appear to be his ambitions, not the Swiss Constitution, Switzerland’s interests or the concerns of the people.

“….dass der Bundesrat durch das Kollegialprinzip dazu gezwungen wird, gefällte Entscheide als Gremium zu kommunizieren und persönliche Meinungen zurückzuhalten. Eine schweizerische Besonderheit besteht in der Aufgabe des Bundesrates, die Stimmberechtigten über die Vorlagen bei Volksabstimmungen zu informieren.

Im Ergebnis zeichnet sich die Argumentation der Regierung dadurch aus, dass sie eher informativ, pragmatisch, sachlich, deeskalierend und kaum konfrontativ ist. Der Bundesrat muss sich bei seinen Informationsaktivitäten vor Abstimmungen insbesondere an die Grundsätze der Sachlichkeit, der Transparenz und der Verhältnismässigkeit halten.

Es ist ihm untersagt, einseitige Propaganda für eine Vorlage zu betreiben. Eine Verletzung der Abstimmungsfreiheit durch die bundesrätlichen Erläuterungen aufgrund der Unterdrückung wichtiger Sachverhalte und der Weitergabe irreführender Informationen kommt vor. So wurde eine solche Verletzung vom Bundesgericht festgestellt.

Das Bundesgericht folgerte daraus, dass die falschen und intransparenten Informationen des Bundesrates eine schwerwiegende Verletzung der Abstimmungsfreiheit der Stimmbürgerinnen und Stimmbürger darstellen würden (BGE 1C_315/2018)“. (Quelle: A. Vatter, Der Bundesrat, Zürich 2020).